Is the U.S. Changing Its Stance on Taiwan?

From The New York Times, Im Sabrina Tavernise. This is The Daily.

For decades, the United States has walked a careful line when it comes to Taiwan, vowing to protect the island from China without saying exactly how far it would go to do that. On Monday, that appeared to change. I spoke to my colleague David Sanger on why the shift in thinking about Taiwan has a lot to do with the lessons of the war in Ukraine.

Its Tuesday, May 24.

So David, tell us what happened over the weekend.

Sabrina, President Biden was on his really first big trip to Northeast Asia since he became president. And that was a big deal, because his foreign policy prior to the invasion of Ukraine was all about the pivot to Asia to focusing American attention on China. Because thats where our biggest competition economically comes from, because thats where our biggest military competition comes from and because thats where our biggest technological competition comes from.

So he made his first stop in South Korea. And he was barely off the airplane before he was in a Samsung factory that makes semiconductors. A factory that is being replicated in the United States. And the whole purpose of that visit was to say South Korea, our ally, is helping us become less dependent on China for microelectronics. And then he went on to the usual visits there. And then he got to Japan where he met with Fumio Kishida, the prime minister.

They had a brief press conference.

And President Biden was asked about Taiwan, the island that has long been at the center of tension between the U.S. and China. And the question has always been

Would the United States defend Taiwan militarily if China tried to take Taiwan by force the way Russia took Ukraine by force? And his answer was

Thats the commitment we made. And then he immediately seemed to recognize that he was stepping into that great diplomatic black hole of how one talks about Taiwan. Because of course, the United States has had, ever since Nixon recognized China, a One China policy that has basically been designed to say that there is only one China.

That its up to China and Taiwan to sort out their relationship. But they must do it peacefully. And so he went on to say

Were not changing anything from back in the Nixon era.

So David, I guess Im wanting to kind of roll the clock back and understand what is our relationship with Taiwan.

Sabrina, it is one of the most complicated relationships in diplomacy around the world. And thats rooted in a pretty messy history. Of course, there was a civil war underway in the 30s and 40s in China. In 1949, it was clear that Maos forces were going to take all of mainland China. And thats of course what created what Washington called during the Cold War Communist China. But about two million followers of Maos chief opponent, General Chiang Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan, just about 100 miles across the Strait of Taiwan and set up the Republic of China.

So there were two Chinas at the time.

There were two, although we only recognized Taiwan, the Republic of China. And of course, during the Cold War, that was the China that the United States recognized for so long. This all changed come 1972, when Nixon shocked the world by going to China and meeting Mao, became the first president to visit the mainland while in office.

And that raised the question of: How do you deal with Taiwan? Because Mao made it clear to Nixon during their talks that they would not normalize their relations with the United States as long as Washington had formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. So eventually, the United States switched its recognition to Beijing. And Nixon said that the U.S. did not support Taiwanese independence.

But instead, through a series of communiques that were carefully negotiated out, the concept was that there was a single China. That Beijing had to sort out its own relationship with Taiwan. But that it had to be a peaceful resolution. And that the United States, we determined over time, would continue to sell the arms to Taiwan that were needed to assure that Taiwan could not be taken over militarily.

Now, in all of these agreements, in the Taiwan Relations Act, theres nothing that requires the United States to send its own troops or its own Navy to defend Taiwan. It only requires that we help Taiwan defend itself, whatever that means. And there is actually only one senior politician still in power in Washington who is deeply familiar with the Taiwan Relations Act.

Whos that?

Its Joe Biden.

Oh, wow.

Who was a young Senator from Delaware at the time, deeply interested in foreign affairs.

Interesting.

Went to Taiwan many times as the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Knows the ins and outs of the wording, the delicate politics. So this is not as if we have a neophyte to this issue stumbling into wording on the topic. He knew exactly the sensitivities.

Joe Biden has a PhD in this relationship.

And a lot of practical experience with what happens when you talk about it wrongly. In fact, about 20 years ago, when I was first covering the White House, George W. Bush answered a question similarly to the way President Biden did yesterday and said he would do whatever it took to defend Taiwan.

And then, of course, the White House backtracked a bit. But there was a really searing op-ed that appeared in The Washington Post reminding President Bush that were words matter when it comes to discussing such a sensitive issue. And the op-ed went on to say theres a huge difference between reserving the right to use force and obligating ourselves, Americans, to come to the defense of Taiwan. And the author of this accused Bush of inattention to detail. And of course, it was written by Joe Biden.

Interesting. So hes been thinking about this for a long time.

He has, Sabrina. And hes been thinking about how presidents talk about the issue. Because at the core of this is an American doctrine that we maintain something called strategic ambiguity about how we would defend Taiwan. Now, I realize that sounds like total diplospeak, right?

It does. I dont understand it.

Right, but what it means is you want to leave some doubt in the minds of the Chinese leaders about how heavily the United States would come to the defense of Taiwan. So that they think twice about trying to take over Taiwan, or even putting an embargo on Taiwan squeezing it, depriving it of food or fuel, any of the things you could do to basically quarantine an island. So you want to make the Chinese think about the possibility that they could be facing the U.S. Navy if they did this.

Keep them guessing.

Thats right. But President Biden, as president, has begun to talk in the kind of stronger terms that Bush did 20 years ago. He was asked about Taiwan after the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan. And he made it clear that we considered it a commitment to come to their defense.

And then, back in October, he appeared at a CNN Town Hall event. And he was asked whether the U.S. would protect Taiwan. And he said yes, we have a commitment to do that. And of course, the White House immediately jumped in to say, no, no, no he wasnt changing policy. We still have strategic ambiguity.

Well, what did he do? He came back and basically did the same thing during this trip to Korea and Japan. And thats pretty fascinating, because now, the context is so different given the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

So how has the war made such a difference?

Its an interesting question, Sabrina, because its made the possibility of an invasion and the United States getting sucked into a war with another nuclear armed superpower incredibly real. People are thinking about this now in an entirely different way. And so the United States has learned a huge amount from the world reaction, organized largely in Washington, to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And the U.S. is hoping that China has been watching and learning the same lessons as well.

Well be right back.

So David, what lessons has the Biden administration taken from the conflict in Ukraine when it comes to China?

Its really interesting, Sabrina. I think the Biden administration is hoping that the first lesson that is clear from the reaction to the Ukraine invasion is that America is back. Chinas view of the United States was that it was so internally divided, so riven by the political upheavals that surrounded the last election in January 6, that we were sort of left for dead by the side of the road. And they could continue their clear march toward exceeding the United States economically, technologically and militarily in the next few decades.

But the performance of the U.S. and its allies over the past three months has sent some potentially different messages. First, Biden and his allies organized an incredible airlift of arms to the Ukrainians that were remarkably effective in taking on a much larger, presumably more sophisticated, Russian military. Second, the U.S. and its allies put together some truly damaging sanctions that have made Russia sort of an international pariah.

And so what President Biden is clearly hoping is that the Chinese would look at this and say, could this all happen to us? And that the experience of the Ukraine war would add to the deterrent effect that would make the Chinese think twice if in case they were planning on taking on Taiwan, either with a direct attack or trying to go slowly squeeze it.

But David, also, China isnt Russia. And Ukraine isnt Taiwan. So how would a potential conflict with China over Taiwan be different from the one we see in Ukraine?

Its a great question, because while there are some superficial similarities, there are a lot of big differences. I mean, the first thing the Chinese will tell you is, well, our military isnt the Russian military. And our gear isnt built by Russian engineers. Its built by Chinese engineers in Chinese factories with Chinese artificial intelligence infused in it. So their first reaction would be dont confuse the kind of fight the Russians put up with what the Chinese military could do.

Because the Chinese think their military is better.

Thats right. And there are also geographical differences. This has been a land war we have been watching unfold for the past three months. But it would be very different in the case of Taiwan. Thats a war that would take place largely at sea, and of course, in outer space.

What do you mean?

Key to running the Chinese and American navies around Taiwan would be communications, intelligence and visibility that comes from our satellite assets. And thats one of the reasons that the Chinese have invested so heavily in anti-satellite technology.

So thats a huge difference. The Chinese would actually be shooting our satellites out of the sky.

Thats right. They would be trying to blind us. And we would be trying to blind them. And along the way, we would probably be turning off each others cyber capabilities, our internet, and so forth.

Got it.

And theres another key difference in this example, Sabrina. Ukraine and Taiwan are incredibly different places. So a conflict in Taiwan would impact the Western world on a scale which the war in Ukraine simply cannot. Taiwan is a huge exporter of the semiconductors that we all need the most.

They come out of a giant factory up on a hill outside of Taipei owned by Taiwan Semiconductor. Taiwan Semiconductor makes the worlds most sophisticated chips. It exports them to the United States. So if there was a war over Taiwan, you could see the United States plunge into a recession or depression by virtue of the fact that we might not be able to get the chips that run our cars and run our factories and run our new equipment.

But David, hasnt the U.S. made a big push to build its own semiconductors?

We have, but its at its very infant stages here. So thats why President Biden was visiting that Samsung factory. Its why he celebrated when Taiwan Semiconductor announced that it was going to build a major facility in the United States and begin producing here as well. But thats going to take years to come together.

And even when it does, its going to account for maybe 5 percent of Taiwan Semiconductors production, hardly what you would need in order to maintain an independent supply in the United States. Remember that cars used to have a few hundred semiconductors to them. The low end of the BMW line now has several thousand. The high end has tens of thousands. And as you move to self-driving cars, those numbers rise quickly.

And thats just the auto industry. So were in a position now where its going to be a long, long time before we can declare any kind of independence in the semiconductor arena. And until then, Chinas got leverage.

So David, weve been talking about this looming confrontation between the U.S. and China as if its this real possibility. But how seriously should we be thinking about a potential invasion of Taiwan? I mean, is that a real threat?

I think its a real possibility. Certainly if you ask around in the Pentagon, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is one of those scenarios that is constantly war gamed, where we often try to figure out who would gain the advantage. Its rarely talked about in public.

So it really struck me the other day when Admiral Charles Richard, whos the commander of the United States Strategic Command thats the command that runs all of our nuclear arsenal said that he was worried that Beijing was learning lessons from the way that President Putin has threatened Ukraine. And they would apply those lessons to Taiwan.

He said in some congressional testimony that the Chinese are quote, watching the war in Ukraine closely and will likely use nuclear coercion to their advantage in future conflicts. And he said explicitly that Beijings aim, quote, is to achieve the military capability to reunify Taiwan by 2027, if not sooner. Now remember, he said the word capability. He didnt say they would actually go do it. But that was pretty stark.

David, what do this trip and Bidens comments tell us about the administrations China policy?

Well, the first thing that it tells us is that the hawks inside the administration, who believe that the United States has to take a much tougher line with competing with China wherever we can and pushing back on Chinas military ambitions, are sort of winning the day. But the second thing that it tells you about this administration is that they may be rethinking the utility of strategic ambiguity.

How so?

There is a line of thought in the foreign policy community that strategic ambiguity was terrific during that period from the Nixon trip in 1972 to roughly the present day. But that it has, as Richard Haass, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations and a longtime diplomat, put it not so long ago, Its grown long in the tooth. And maybe what one needs to deal with a much more aggressive and much more capable China is some strategic clarity, some clear statement to the Chinese that if you take on Taiwan, you are taking on the United States as well.

And so its possible that what were watching unfold here is Biden trying to signal, somewhat subtly, to the Chinese, yeah, we still have strategic ambiguity. But its not that ambiguous while Im around. That if you did something truly overt with Taiwan, youd be looking at the Americans in the region, even if you werent looking at them in direct combat. He may be just using the Ukraine crisis here to make the Chinese leadership think twice about what price they would pay if they sailed forward around Taiwan.

David, thank you.

Thank you.

Well be right back.

Heres what else you need to know today. On Monday, a Russian diplomat at the United Nations mission in Geneva resigned, saying he had, quote, never been so ashamed of my country as when Russia invaded Ukraine.

Boris Bondarev became the most prominent Russian official to resign and publicly criticize the war, a move that is unlikely to reach most Russians, but is a sign of discontent in the upper ranks of Russian power. In an email to his colleagues, he said that those who started the war, quote, want only one thing, to remain in power forever. And he said that they are willing to sacrifice as many lives as it takes to achieve that.

And an investigation published by Americas largest Protestant denomination, the Southern Baptist Convention, said that national leaders of the 14 million strong denomination suppressed reports of sexual abuse and resisted proposals of reform for over two decades. The report was commissioned last year after mounting pressure from survivors of sexual abuse in Southern Baptist churches. It found that the churchs executive committee had kept a list that contained the names of hundreds of alleged abusers. But that church officials had covered it up. It also found a pattern of intimidation of survivors.

Todays episode was produced by Asthaa Chaturvedi, Michael Simon Johnson, Rikki Novetsky and Sydney Harper. It was edited by Michael Benoist and M.J. Davis Lin; contains original music by Dan Powell and Marion Lozano; and was engineered by Chris Wood. Our theme music is by Jim Brunberg and Ben Landsverk of Wonderly.

Thats it for The Daily. Im Sabrina Tavernise. See you tomorrow.