Your primer on France’s snap elections

What are the stakes?

Never, in the last fifty years, have the stakes in a French election been so high. This electoral campaign has been unprecedentedly short, dramatic, intense, and uncertain. The country has been totally surprised by Macrons decision to call snap elections. The defeat of the presidents party in the European elections was expected and didnt have any direct consequence in domestic politics. It wasnt necessary to rush to elections at such short notice. And there is no assurance that the elections outcome will take France on a stable path.

The opposite is the most likely scenario. Some are saying that Macron has thrown the country under the bus. Polls show increasing bitterness toward him.

Suddenly, France is facing the prospect of a government led by the far right or far left, considering that the presidents centrist party is generally expected to lose ground. A government led by the far right or far left would face domestic and international backlash. In the best-case scenario (or more accurately in the least-bad scenario), the elections could lead to a hung parliament and therefore an essentially ungovernable country. In any case, France has been stepping into a prolonged political crisis with unpredictable consequences. Some opponents even suggested that in the event of political deadlock, the president would need to resign to avoid political crisis.

No matter what Macron will try to assert, France will be much weakened in international affairs. That will particularly be the case on two issues. The first is Ukraine, where the far right and far left have advocated for more engagement and negotiation with Russia. The second is the European Union (EU), where the two extremes of the political spectrum share similar Euroskepticism. With the United Kingdom drifting away and Germany facing its own crisis, there will be a vacuum in the European leadership at a moment when the continent can hardly afford it.

Gerard Araud, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Councils Europe Center and former ambassador of France to the United States.

What are Macron’s goals and ambitions in calling this election now?

There are numerous theories as to why Macron called early parliamentary elections, especially with his party lagging so far behind in the polls. Macron has described the move as the most responsible decision following his partys disastrous showing in the recent European Parliament elections. It could be that the French president is simply respecting the electorates overwhelming decision. But more realistically, Macrons calculation is more complicated. Among the going theories as to why he called for elections, a handful stand out:

Macron could be hoping to catch his competitors by surprise, forcing them to pull together last-minute campaigns, while spurring action among his base with the memory of the far rights gains fresh in their minds. The move could also be a bet that the French public would not actually double down on their protest vote, a vote often exercised in European elections, and would rather choose unpopular prudence in Macrons party over the populist anger of protest parties on the far right and far left. This move assumes that the publics vote in June was, in fact, just a protest vote and not a deeper shift within France to the extremes.
Macron might be making a tactical retreat. Marine Le Pens National Rally is in a strong position to win the most seats in the National Assembly and thus has the best shot at forming a government with Le Pens protg, Jordan Bardella, at the helm. A far-right government could demonstrate the potential failures of far-right leadership. The move could grant the public its desire for change while presenting a sobering reality ahead of the vastly more critical presidential elections in 2027. However, this thinking assumes that the far rightwhen handed the keys to the governmentwill fail and that any dysfunction would fall at their feet, not at Macrons.
Macron could be looking to carve out a new place for himself. In the wake of Macrons announcement, a number of left-leaning partiesincluding the Socialist Party, the Ecologists, La France Insoumise, and the Communist Partyunited to form the New Popular Front, which is now polling second behind the far right. With both the left and right having the potential to emerge victorious from the elections, Macron can present himself as the savior of the center, potentially swaying some less radically inclined voters to his camp, similar to what he did when he first ran for office. However, this approach assumes that the ground hasnt shifted under Macrons feet and risks another electoral disaster for the second time in a month.
Finally, and most simply, Macron might just be hoping that his party can pull off a miracle. Prior to dissolving the parliament, Renaissance did not have an absolute majority in the National Assembly and had to build coalitions on a case-by-case basis for every piece of legislation. If he thinks Renaissance has a shot to regain its majority through snap elections, Macron could avoid serving the rest of his term as a lame duck. But looking at the polls, and barring any major changes or shocks, this is the least likely scenario of them all.

Emma Nix, assistant director with the Atlantic Councils Europe Center.

What do the polls say and what might their results mean for the rest of Macron’s term?

At first glance, the polls spell trouble for Macron. The far right leads with a healthy margin (34 percent for the National Rally, 29 percent for the left, and 22 percent for Renaissance).

However, because of how France votes, it isnt clear just how bad the situation really is for the French presidents party. Candidates must get at least 12.5 percent of the registered voters in their district to even continue to the second-round election. While the polls appear decidedly in favor of the National Rally, turnout has the potential to impact how many candidates make it to the second round. In general, high turnout is expected to bolster Renaissances chances of making it out of the first round, and Renaissance competes better against the far right (though still not great) than the left does in polls regarding the second round. Further adding to Macrons glimmer of hope is a recent boost in the polls after the first week of campaigning. Even so, the National Rally appears poised to win the most seats in the National Assembly, which would hamper Macrons agenda and legacy.

The polls are hinting that some of Macrons policies are at risk. The French system assigns the president significant influence over foreign and defense policy, while domestic policy is implemented by the prime minister and the government, which controls the budget and other key levers of power and could spell trouble for Macron. For example, both the left and far right have expressed interest in overturning Macrons controversial pension reforms and have pledged to spend more despite Frances precarious budgetary position. For Macron, implementing his vision for France hasnt been easy. Renaissance already lacks an absolute majority in the National Assembly, making the passage of Macrons agenda difficult. But in any event of cohabitation, or a president and prime minister of different parties, paralysis in government is a likely outcome for the rest of Macrons term.

Emma Nix

What are the key drivers impacting voters in this election?

Ahead of the European elections held earlier in June, French voters indicated that their top concerns were poverty and social exclusion, climate change, and public health. French constituents cared for these issues up to 10 percentage points more than the European average. Inflation and purchasing power also ranked among the most pertinent issues and are expected to similarly drive voter dynamics in the upcoming snap election. Current polls point to immigration, social protection, and security as other issues driving voter preferences, laying the groundwork for a shift to the right.

For many, this election will be personality-driven. Dissatisfaction with Macrons leadership seems to be fueling anti-elite sentiments among voters. Only 28 percent of the French public is favorable towards the president, ranking lower than right-wing figures such as Bardella and Le Pen and also lower than current Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, a member of Renaissance.

Frances political blocs have moved in the past to cater to voter priorities. Macrons Renaissance announced an unemployment insurance reform decree between the two voting rounds, and the National Rally promises to reduce energy prices drastically and to toughen immigration laws. During this campaign, left-wing parties have attempted to appeal to voters in part by promising to repeal Macrons controversial 2023 pension reform.

Moritz Ludwig, young global professional with the Atlantic Councils Europe Center.

What might the election outcomes mean for France’s foreign policy approach?

Whatever the actual results of the snap election, its implications for Frances foreign policy might actually take a long time to be felt. This has to do with the practices of the countrys institutions and with the goals a new government would actually pursue (assuming Renaissance will not pull off a victory).

On the first point, the French constitution does not provide clear guidelines on the roles assumed by the president and the prime minister. The president traditionally has domaine rserv (reserved domain) on foreign and defense policies. If the polls prove true, the president will have to govern with a majority from the opposition. This isnt the first time the president would need to do so, but two features make todays case exceptional: It could be the first time that a far-right party such as the National Rally would rule, and there seems to be less potential for consensus on foreign policy between parties than in the past.

What has worked in the past is no guarantee for the future, and the foreign-policy role of the prime minister (and the government he or she oversees) remains a question mark. Paralyzed domestically, Macron may be tempted to spend more energy on the international stage. Or, on the contrary, he might need to get much more involved domestically on issues he prioritizes, such as the budget law. In both cases, there are effects to be felt. Should he focus abroad, he would likely be undermined by his government should it have conflicting foreign-policy priorities. Should he focus inward, France would risk its credibility on the international stage, and there would be an increasing likelihood that many French voices push their own contradictory proposals.

Whats more, French domestic politics could spill into the international scene. If there is no majority in the National Assembly, delivering on promises made to the voters may prove to be increasingly difficult. The necessity for political wins might encourage a new government to be more active in foreign policy. Because of the greater difficulty in reaching consensus, both the president and the governing party will have to prioritize which political battles to fight. Foreign policy might well be collateral.

The specific foreign-policy aims that will actually be pursued remain uncertain. Here, the personnel may well determine policy. The political party of the minister of defense or the minister for Europe and foreign affairs will be much more critical now in determining Frances foreign-policy direction than in the past few years. On the left, despite remarkable differences, the New Popular Front succeeded in finding consensus on issues that initially split them (Hamas October 7 terrorist attack on Israel had a major impact in dissolving the left coalition in the National Assembly, for instance). However, foreign policy is definitely one of the areas in which the parties have the least in common. As for the far right, the ever-changing positions on key foreign-policy issueslike Frances leadership in the European Union, support to Ukraine, and Frances approach to NATOindicates more about what it would not do (at least for now) and less about the issues it would realistically pursue.

Foreign policy has rarely been a key issue for French voters in elections, and these snap elections are no exception. Yet, the belief that French foreign policy would be preserved from the turmoil of the domestic scene is, at best, wishful thinking.

Marie Jourdain, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Councils Europe Center.

What might the election outcomes specifically mean for…

Since 1958, Frances constitution, combined with its institutional and political norms, has afforded the president broad discretiona reserved domainon issues involving defense and foreign policy. During three previous periods of cohabitation, when French parliamentary elections were won by the opposition party, a broad consensus on those issues allowed the president and opposition figures (including the prime minister) to avoid major clashes. Will the past be prologue?

If Macrons party suffers minimal losses, he likely would muster continued support for his stance on NATOand, most notably, his steps to increase bilateral and multilateral military assistance to Ukrainefrom a number of center-right and moderate leftist members of the National Assembly.

Since Russias full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the far-right National Rally has scaled back its most explicit anti-NATO rhetoric. It no longer calls for Frances withdrawal from NATOs integrated military structures (as Le Pen did in the 2022 presidential race), and it currently calls for support to Ukraine. But National Rally leaders are skeptical of the scale of aid to Ukraine, especially Macrons recent calls for supplying offensive French combat aircraft, more sophisticated missiles, and training for Kyivs embattled forces. A prime minister and foreign and defense ministers drawn fromor acceptable tothe National Rally would likely trim back French contributions to NATOs forward posture enhancements in Eastern Europe and oppose Ukrainian membership in NATO and the EU.

A parliamentary majority led by the lefts New Popular Front coalition, perhaps the least likely election outcome, could be disruptive for NATO and support for Ukraine. On one hand, the recently unveiled program provides very little information on military issues, including NATO, but it clearly calls for indefectible defense of Ukrainian peoples sovereignty and freedom, including integrity of borders through the necessary arm transfers. But on the other, there is reason to doubt that Jean-Luc Mlenchon, leader of the far-left France Insoumise party, and his loyalists take that statement seriously as during the 2022 legislative elections, they played down Russian aggression and the illegal annexation of Crimea, questioned the effectiveness of sanctions against Moscow, and blamed NATO for causing trouble. Mlenchon has been a longtime and virulent opponent of French membership in NATO and, in effect, has accused Macron of getting closer to dragging France into war with Russia. But a push by Mlenchon for French retrenchment on a range of issues, including NATO and Ukraine, would be fought by others in the leftist coalition, especially from members of the Socialist and Ecologists parties. The result could be, as the French expression goes, that chaos “reigns, but does not govern.

Leo Michel, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Councils Transatlantic Security Initiative.

France’s role in the EU

A French legislature controlled by the far left or far right could spell big problems for the EU. The past term saw a huge raft of EU legislation passed, which now needs to be transposed and implemented into national law. Macron may be sticking around regardless of the legislative election outcome, and he will remain in charge of the country’s foreign policy, but it will be up to the French legislature to transpose these EU directives.

With both the far right and the far left having expressed antipathy toward the EU, there is a big question about whether they may refuse to do that. This was highlighted with the European Commission’s announcement that it is launching an excessive deficit procedure against France, which will be followed by instructions in the fall for fiscal tightening to reduce France’s deficit. Both the far right and far left have made campaign promises that would significantly increase France’s spending and borrowing, and politicians on both sides were quick to attack the Commission and say they would not follow such instructions. If they don’t, fines will follow.

But France is no ordinary EU member state. It is the most powerful and influential country in the EU institutions (not, as many think, Germany). That is why France usually gets lenient treatment. For instance, the Commission declined to trigger the excessive deficit procedure against France many times over the past decade even though the countrys deficit was beyond the threshold. Open fighting between the Commission and the French Parliament could spell trouble for the future of the EU since France sits at the heart of the European project. If the French parliament openly defies Brussels and refuses to abide by the country’s international obligations, how far is the Commission willing to go as the guarantor of the EU treaties?

Dave Keating, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Councils Europe Center.