What to look for as Xi Jinping visits France, Serbia, and Hungary

Serbia

Over the past fifteen years, Serbia has developed a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, based on a close economic and political relationship. China has emerged as Serbias largest individual provider of foreign direct investment, its second-largest trading partner after the EU, and a key partner in much-needed infrastructure development. Xis upcoming visit to Serbia offers an opportunity for both sides to showcase the achievements of their cooperation over the past decade and a half.

However, it is unlikely that the leaders will address the challenges arising from increased Chinese presence in the country. These include the negative environmental impact of Chinese companies, lack of transparency in negotiating infrastructure projects, and criticism from Serbias Western partners, who view the country as a Chinese hub at the gateway to the EU.

Xis visit will be the second in eight years and comes with much symbolism. Scheduled for May 7-8, it coincides with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the intervention in Yugoslavia, which eventually led to the fall of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevis regime. This event significantly impacted Chinese sentiment toward NATO and the global governance system that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Today, the bombing remains a significant topic for Chinese officials, who use it to support narratives that question the values of liberal democracies. For Serbia, the visit presents an opportunity to strengthen its position as Chinas main partner in the Western Balkans. This marks the highest-level visit to Serbia in years and carries with it the hope of new joint projects that will facilitate the countrys economic growth.

Stefan Vladisavljev is a program director at Foundation BFPE for a Responsible Society.

Hungary

Xis visit to Europe is part of the Chinese leaderships efforts to reverse Europes toughening policy on de-risking from China. Central and Eastern Europe plays an important role in this mission as Beijing has found several like-minded countries here that also challenge Washingtons (and its closest allies) current geopolitical strategy and wish to build closer relations with China and Russia. Serbia and Hungary are key pieces in this Chinese puzzle.

In Hungary, Xi is meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbn, who has closely aligned Hungarys foreign policy with China and Russia in the past decade. Budapest joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2015 and has been doing Beijings bidding within the European Union on Chinas human rights record and Taiwan.

Xi is expected to discuss with Orbn several of the ongoing BRI infrastructure projects and reach agreements on new ones. He is likely to raise the issue of accelerating the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway project during his talks both in Belgrade and Budapest. The project was launched in 2019, but construction on the Hungarian side had been lagging until the Hungarian government decided to speed up the work earlier this year. In February, Greece announced that it would join this project and expand it to Athens, counterbalancing Italys recent withdrawal from BRI by creating an alternative route for Chinese exports to reach the heart of Europe from the south.

Xi and Orbn are expected to announce major new BRI projects as well. To support increasing industrial output in Hungary, China is going to build the railway line connecting Liszt International Airport with Budapest as well as the so-called V0 railway ring, designed to help move international freight traffic outside of the capital. The two leaderswill reportedly pay a visit to the southern city of Pcs to announce a major investment by Chinese auto maker Great Wall Motor in establishing a new factory in Bicsrd to produce medium and premium category cars for the European market.

Furthermore, they are likely to discuss the implementation of their recently signed bilateral security cooperation agreement, which allows Chinese police officers to work in Hungary in neighborhoods with extensive Chinese immigrant populations or a high Chinese tourist presence.

Zoltn Fehr is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Councils Global China Hub. Previously, he worked as a foreign policy analyst at the Hungarian embassy in Washington, DC, and as Hungarys deputy ambassador and acting ambassador in Turkey.

The choice of European countries for Xis visit and the timing ahead of the European elections in June are hardly fortuitous in Chinas geopolitical calculus. Xi seeks to ease trade tensions, particularly as Europe intensifies scrutiny of Chinas purportedly unjust commercial practices across various sectors, spanning from EVs to medical devices and solar panels. Also central to Xis itinerary is his effort to sustain Chinese influence in Central and Eastern Europe, a region which has increasingly distanced itself from cooperation with Moscow after Russias invasion of Ukraine. 

China seeks to explore ways to exploit strategic weakness against Europe and deploy its signature divide and conquer strategy. Budapesta vocal EU critic, which espouses a pragmatic, values-neutral stance toward economic relationshas been especially useful to this end. The country has lured some ten billion euros worth of Chinese investments just in the last year. The willingness to enhance cooperation further, potentially going beyond just economic and investment issues to the infrastructure and security realms, seems to be mutual. Orbn sees the partnership as pivotal to becoming Europes hotbed for EV and EV battery manufacturing in the next few years.

Xi’s forthcoming diplomatic voyage to Europe is a significant chapter in China’s strategic playbook. It embodies Beijings skillful navigation of the delicate balance between aggressively advancing its economic imperatives and preserving amicable diplomatic relations, possibly even bolstering its sway in certain quarters of the continent. 

Soa Muzikrov is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a political economist focused on Central and Eastern Europe.

European Union

EU-China relations have worsened. Xis visit to Europe, therefore, comes at an important time. The key question for the EU is: Does he have anything attractive to offer? China challenges the EU in two core arenassecurity and the economy. In spite of repeated outreach by European leaders, there has been no real progress. Beijing is doubling down on its support for Russias war in Ukraine, and Chinese overcapacities are threatening to flood the European market.  

The European Commissions patience has run thin. Now, preliminary action follows words. Brussels has plans to add more Chinese firms to the Russia sanctions blacklist, has launched raids against Chinese manufacturer Nuctech over foreign subsidies, opened proceedings against Chinese-owned social media company TikTok, and used its international procurement instrument to investigate Chinas medical devices sector. Brussels is signaling to Beijing that somethings got to give. But its a balancing act. The Commission needs to raise the pressure yet avoid a downward spiral by staying below the threshold of Chinese retaliatory action. 

So all eyes are on Xi: Will the emperor bring gifts, such as Chinese participation in the Ukraine peace conference, reduced material support for Russia, and greater economic opportunities for the EU? Or will he placate and divide the Europeans by making bilateral offers, for example, to Viktor Orbn? Macrons invitation to von der Leyen to join his meeting with Xi is in this regard a strong move, ensuring that the Commission has a voice in this exchange.

Roderick Kefferptz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Councils Europe Center and the director of the Heinrich-Bll-Stiftung European Union office in Brussels. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Heinrich-Bll-Stiftung.